B

In one way White's is a typical manoeuvre, as he tries to rid himself of a bad bishop and perhaps damage Black's pawns. That definitely has its value. But the plan is also decentralizing, and it's probably a bit much to waste three tempi to give up the bishop-pair, weaken control of e4, and do so without even forcing Black to accept doubled pawns!

This is probably a mistake although that's not completely clear. Harding points out Black's moves 13-15 were a suggestion from the magazine Ceskoslovensky Sack. I doubt that they are very good because they justify White's retention of the dark-squared bishop by allowing

Perhaps this is not quite sound in some objective sense, but Black was beginning to dominate the board. Bronstein's knight sacrifice radically disturbs the peace: 35...gxf3 (35...cxb4 36 cxb4 gxf3 37 Wxf3 4&f6 {37...Sg8!} 38 Sel Wg4 39 Wf2 £\g6 40 c5 dxc5 41 bxc5 with very interesting play) 36 Wxf3 Wg4 37 Wf2 cxb4 38 cxb4 Sbb8 39 c5 £ic8 40 5c 1 <£>d8? 41 c6 Sb5 42 h3 ®g6 43 cxd7 &xd7 44 ®e2 and White went on to win.

14 £.xc6 bxc6 15 cxd4 Wf6 16 ±t3 h5 17 dxe5 dxe5 18 Sbl 2d8 19 Wc2 h4 20 £>f5 ±xf5 21 exf5 0-0

Harding: "Purdy observes that despite the kingside pawn advances, the black king is safer on g8 than in the centre."

Still, I think that Black should force White to 31 gxf3 Wxf3 32 &f 1 falls short. But 30...hxg2!

come after the a-pawn by 22...a6 rather than give it away so easily. 23 JLxa7 £>g7 24 a4?! Not terrible, but I don't like the idea behind keeps Black on top.

Harding offers the line 31 Sb8 ®g4 32 g3 e3! 33 ±xe3 Wf3 (but 33...£tf3+! 34 &hl ftel it at all. As pointed out by Suba and supported looks like a draw) 34 1 £}f5 35 ^el ^xe3 36 by several examples that I came up with in ®xe3, which he thinks is slightly better for

SOMCS, passed rook's pawns tend to be an advantage in the ending but a problem in the middlegame. Here White, who stands considerably better in my estimation, should attend to the business of simplification first by 24 3ic5 2fe8 25 ©e4! ^xf5 26 2xd8 2xd8 27 h3 followed by 2el; for example, 27...<SM4 (27... <¿^7 28 2el 2e8 29 ±b6 with ideas like Ac7, and also a4-a5, since simplification has occurred) 28 2el £>b3 29 ±b6. This seems to establish a substantial advantage for White.

Purdy questions whether to allow ...h3, giving Black at least speculative counterplay and perhaps more. He suggests 25 h3 and Harding agrees. White should retain a nice advantage in that case along the lines of the last note.

White should at least get some pieces off by 26 2xd8. This move is also tactically wrong.

Both the a6-pawn and ...hxg2 are threatened. Black has real chances now.

A dynamic move that is logical in every sense. Alternatively, Black might want to be sure to get 28...hxg2 in, but that doesn't seem necessary.

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